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Abstract:  The article examines the trajectories of ‘loyal’ African troops 
in Angola before and after the demise of Portugal’s authoritarian regime 
in 1974. It starts by placing the ‘Africanization’ drive of the Portuguese 
counterinsurgency campaign in a historical perspective; it then explores 
the rocky transition from colonial rule to independence in the territory 
between April 1974 and November 1975, describing the course of action 
taken by the Portuguese authorities vis-à-vis their former collaborators in 
the security forces. A concluding section draws a comparison between the 
fate of Portugal’s loyalists in Angola and the one experienced by similar 
groups in other ex-Portuguese colonies. The choice of Angola has the 
advantage of allowing us to look into a complex scenario in which the 
competition amongst rival nationalist groups, and a number of external 
factors, helped to produce a more ambiguous outcome for some of the 
empire’s local collaborators than what might have been otherwise 
expected. 
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The dissolution of Portugal’s overseas empire in 1975 happened after a 
protracted counterinsurgency war which took place in three of its African 
territories (Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique), a 13 year conflict (1961-
74) that put an enormous strain on the limited demographic and economic 
resources of what was then Western Europe’s poorest and most undeveloped 
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state.  The gradual weariness produced by the stalemate in Africa did not bring 
about a significant change in the discourse articulated by Portugal’s last 
authoritarian leader, Marcelo Caetano. Until his demise, in April 1974, Caetano 
remained hostage to the basic tenets of the hard-line stance on the empire, 
which stressed the ‘intangibility’ of the nation’s colonial sovereignty and refused 
to contemplate even an ‘evolution’ towards a more decentralized-cum 
federalized imperial structure (as Caetano himself had proposed in the early 
1960s). For the most intransigent elements of the regime, the notion of a 
negotiation with the African guerrillas was conceived as a betrayal of the 
nation’s ‘sacred heritage’, as well as a threat to the country’s own security and 
economic independence.1  
  
 During his six-year tenure, Caetano strengthened Portugal’s ties with 
the white powers of southern Africa and tried to suppress (or at least contain) 
the insurgents’ challenge. The most he was prepared to concede was a measure 
of administrative autonomy to the overseas provinces, while hoping that the 
pace of economic growth would diminish the appeal of the nationalists in 
Angola and Mozambique.  Until 1971, at least, there was even hope in Lisbon 
that a ‘decisive’ military victory might be achieved. Charismatic generals in 
Angola, Guinea and Mozambique were given carte blanche to conduct bold 
operations against the guerrilla’s bases and sanctuaries, some of them involving 
the violation of the territorial sovereignty of neighbouring states, and efforts 
were undertaken to acquire military equipment best suited to a 
counterinsurgency conflict, such as helicopters and light aircraft. Ambitious 
resettlements schemes were implemented with a view to isolate the non-
combatant civilian populations from the guerrillas, while sums allocated in the 
Development Plans to the welfare of the Africans were reinforced.2  
 
Aware of the war’s growing unpopularity, especially among young male 
adults and their families, Caetano was anxious to find ways of alleviating the 
war’s burden in the metropolis. This meant two things. One was to increase the 
financial contribution of the two larger provinces, Angola and Mozambique, to 
meet their own administration and ‘security’ costs. The other, which will be 
examined in this article, was the expansion of the military conscription in the 
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overseas territories and the deployment of an ever-growing number of 
‘auxiliary’ or ‘irregular’ native troops. This latter option was also expected to add 
credibility to an important feature of the regime’s propaganda – the claim that 
Portugal was not fighting a war to prop up the privileges of a white minority, or 
selfish metropolitan interests, but rather to help Guineans, Angolans and 
Mozambicans defend themselves against the ‘foreign aggression’ of guerrillas 
trained and armed by communist powers. Even though a hypothetical future 
political role for those African ‘loyalists’ who rallied to the Portuguese flag was 
never openly discussed, they would gradually come to constitute an important 
element of Portugal’s security apparatus in the final days of empire.  
 
 
War on the cheap: Portugal and its collaborators in Angola 
The enlistment of African elements either as allies or auxiliaries as part 
of Portugal’s drive to expand and consolidate its influence in Angola had a long 
historical pedigree, going back to the early 17th century. The number of Africans 
involved in such campaigns, however, only acquired major significance from the 
mid-19th century, when Portugal sought to establish a regular presence in the 
hinterland of Angola.3 The colonial army accommodated Africans (many of 
them of mulattoes or ‘assimilated’ blacks) predominantly as ‘second line forces’, 
sometimes recruited in native regulados, and usually organized in mobile 
companies led by loyal African chiefs or white settlers.4 But the Portuguese also 
called upon the service of African native armies, better known as empacaceiros 
(hunters of wild buffaloes) or guerra preta (literally ‘black war’), who were 
rewarded with a share of the spoils of war. Without such assistance, Portugal 
could not have extended its hegemony into the hinterlands of its African 
colonies. African colonial military  units, whose soldiers were commonly known 
as cipaios, also proved their usefulness by being deployed to other parts of the 
Portuguese empire – whether to deal with ‘emergencies’, or simply to garrison 
distant imperial outposts at Goa, Macau and East Timor.5 
 
While a few Africans of mixed ethnic origins were able to achieve high 
rank in the imperial army by the mid-nineteenth century,6 the diffusion of 
Social-Darwinist prejudices in the last decades of the century led to a complete 
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‘whitening’ of the ‘first line forces’, which then comprised of only expeditionary 
elements sent from Lisbon. Creole or mulatto Angolans, who had profited from 
their status as intermediaries in previous stages of the colony’s history, were 
now regarded with suspicion, and sometimes scorn, by the Portuguese 
authorities, and deemed unfit for command responsibilities.7 To keep military 
costs down, however, reforms were introduced in 1901 to meet the security 
needs of colonial territories by raising local companies, some of mixed origin, 
others solely constituted by black soldiers, but always headed by European 
officers and sergeants8. Although termed ‘voluntary’, such companies were in 
fact raised through the use of coercive methods (“round-ups”), which might 
involve the taking of hostages and the threat of retaliations against entire 
villages, very much in line with other requisitioning procedures for public sector 
works, mines and plantations then common in Angola.9 
 
Harsh indigenato codes, such as the one adopted in 1899, allowed for 
the forced incorporation of Africans as cipaios and porters in great numbers. 
This was used during the early stages of the Great War, when southern Angola 
came under threat from the neighbouring Germans, and then in the critical 
phase of the ‘pacification campaigns’ of 1916-21. In 1926, further legislation was 
introduced to secure more systematic recruitment for the colonial army, making 
the enlistment of ‘indigenous’ soldiers compulsory. Governors were instructed 
to determine the annual contingent of African recruits, taking into account the 
security situation of the territory and the needs of its labour-intensive economy. 
Race inevitably determined the status of such recruits.  Africans were rarely 
promoted beyond the rank of corporal, received uniforms of a lower quality, and 
received lower pay than their European counterparts.10 While financial 
considerations provided the basic rationale for the 1926 reform, concerns with 
the ‘nationalization’ of Portugal’s African subjects were also relevant. Service in 
the colonial army was viewed as a way to ensure the ‘ablest’ elements of the 
native population were given elementary instruction in Portuguese language 
and literacy, and infused with a patriotic spirit that would build allegiance 
towards the Portuguese flag and national anthem.11  In the 1930s, when crude 
racism became commonplace in the speeches of Portuguese officials, an 
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exception was usually made to the ‘noble warrior races’ that had proven their 
value by joining the military cadres that defended the colonies.12 
 
This framework remained in place until the outbreak of the colonial 
wars in 1961. As nationalism began to emerge elsewhere in Africa during the 
1950s, Portugal’s leaders failed to appreciate the challenge that might soon face 
them. In 1954, a new ‘Statute of the Indigenous’ reaffirmed the basic tenets of 
the old indigenato system. The colonial army’s racial hierarchies were kept in 
place, with soldiers now being recognised in one three categories: 
‘commissioned’ (reserved for whites from the metropolis or the overseas 
provinces); ‘overseas’ (Africans recognized as assimilados); and ‘natives’ 
(Africans recognized as ‘non-assimilated’).13  By 1960, on the eve of the 
nationalist insurrection, the ‘overseas’ and ‘native’ contingents in Angola 
numbered 5,000, while there were only 1,500 commissioned white soldiers.14 
 
As the nationalist uprisings commenced in the early months of 1961, 
the government responded by introducing a range of legal measures designed to 
strengthen their assimilationist and ‘colour-blind’ policy.  In November, the 
indigenato system was repealed, this action theoretically at least placing all 
colonial inhabitants of the Ultramar (Overseas, the new label for the empire 
introduced by the regime in 1951) on the same footing with metropolitan 
citizens. For the army, this should have led directly to the abolition of the racial 
hierarchies restricting rank and status: But, as in other spheres of Portuguese 
colonial society, racial forms of discrimination persisted. Formal educational 
skills, and knowledge of the Portuguese language now became requirements 
determining rank in the military, this effectively restricting African 
advancement.15    
 
During the early stages of the war in Angola the fighting was largely 
conducted by a metropolitan conscript force, the numbers of which soon 
exceeded those of the locally recruited Africans. From just 1,500 soldiers in 
1960, the number of expeditionary elements swelled to 28,477 in 1961 (84.1% of 
the total recruitment) and then to 34,530 (72%) in 1963, and 38, 564 (69%) in 
1966.16 The laws regulating the conscription service in the Ultramar were the 
6 
 
same as in the metropolis (all able bodied men aged between 20 and 45 five 
were liable to serve in the military), but, as Cann notes,17 in the colonies this 
legislation was enforced less strictly in the initial years of the insurgency - 
perhaps on account of the fears in the minds of many Europeans in wake of the 
racial violence that had engulfed Angola in the Luanda riots of February 1961, 
and the UPA (União das Populações de Angola) rising in the following month.18 
 
However, by 1966, with insurgencies in Guinea (since 1963) and 
Mozambique (1964), Portuguese military planners were beginning to struggle to 
meet the manpower demands posed by colonial wars. Portugal’s male youth 
pool was being drained by the high levels of legal as well as clandestine 
migration to Western European countries. Due to the unpopularity of the 
colonial wars among the small but socially influent student population in the 
metropolis, the number of draft dodgers and deserters was increasing.  There 
was also a significant decline in the number of applications to the national 
Military Academy.  To address these problems, the government decided in 1968 
to shift the focus of recruitment from the metropole to the colonies, intensifying 
conscription in the overseas territories and creating special paramilitary units 
drawn from the African population.19  The overall impact of this ‘Africanization’ 
drive in Angola remains difficult to assess.   There is very little hard data on 
those non-white Africans who enrolled in the regular army, since Portuguese 
official statistics ceased to record ethnicity following the repeal of the 
indigenato system in 1961. Of the 228,842 locally recruited soldiers in Angola 
between 1961 and 1974,20 demographics suggest that a high percentage were 
either mulattos or blacks.21  These soldiers were usually integrated into 
ethnically ‘mixed’ companies, received the same pay as their European 
counterparts, and, theoretically at least, had no impediments to promotion. 
Despite this apparently ‘inclusive’ approach, few black soldiers made it to the 
rank of captain, and none managed to rise higher.22  
 
The separation of African soldiers into ‘special’ units indicated the 
persistence of the ‘politics of difference’ in post-1961 Angola.  Black Angolan 
troops were valued for their superior knowledge of the terrain, their fluency in 
local dialects, and their familiarity with local usages and traditions; but some 
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units also displayed a ruthlessness that earned them a notorious reputation.23 
We can distinguish four major categories of special unit. The first comprised 
those placed under PIDE’s (Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado, the 
Portuguese political police) supervision, both in organizational and operational 
terms. Such was the case of the TE (Tropas Especiais,or pecial Troops) initially 
formed in Cabinda in 1966 with 1,200 defectors from UPA/FNLA (Frente 
Nacional de Libertação de Angola), headed by Alexandre Taty, former leader of 
FLEC (Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda), a secessionist group set up 
in 1963. Another example was the Flechas (‘Arrows’), a special combat unit that 
deployed Bushmen (Khoisan) from the Cuando-Cubango region in south-
eastern Angola. The Tropas Especiais would be incorporated in the regular 
army in 1971, with their number dropping to around 800, while the Flechas 
remained under PIDE’s aegis right until 1974, when they numbered 2,270.24  
 
The second category comprised units that were created and developed 
by the military authorities from 1968, known as the Grupos Especiais (Special 
Groups).  These units initially constituted captured guerrilla fighters who 
decided to turn themselves in, the ranks later augmented by locally recruited 
volunteers. Although service in the GE’s was seen as regular military service, 
their discipline and organisation was based on ‘native traditions.’25 As Matos 
Gomes’ observes, GE’s evolved from a self-defence militia model to one of a 
force possessing a high degree of autonomy and operational mobility, benefiting 
from a commando type instruction.26 GE’s soon became the most popular and 
widely disseminated model of African special forces utilised by the Portuguese. 
The philosophy that underpinned their creation was the desire to recruit units 
from within the region in which they would serve. Coelho estimates the fighting 
force of the GE’s to have peaked at around 3,250 men, the majority stationed 
near regular army battalions in the north, east and south of Angola.27  
 
The army also provided training and operational direction to a third 
category of special African troops – units composed of foreign elements who 
had sought refuge in Angola. There were two such groups. The first, and most 
substantial, were the so-called ‘Katangese gendarmes’ – who had served in 
Katanga’s secessionist gendarmerie set up by Moïse Tshombe in 1963.28  After 
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their final defeat in 1967, many of these fighters escaped into the Lunda-
speaking areas of north-east Angola.29 Though their opposition to Mobuto’s 
Zaire made the Katangese an asset to the Portuguese, they were most effectively 
deployed in the Eastern Military Zone as a well-trained unit to combat MPLA 
(Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) and UNITA (União Nacional 
para a Independência Total de Angola) guerrilla activity.  However, the 
Katangese were keener to act against Kinshasa’s authorities than against 
Angola’s nationalists, and so had to be handled with care.  The camps in which 
they were stationed, Gafaria, Chimbila, and Camissombo, were heavily policed 
by the Portuguese authorities.30 By 1974, the Katangese were estimated as a 
force of c. 2,400 fighting elements, organized in 16 companies, scattered in 
various parts of Angola’s Eastern Military Zone, and highly regarded by the 
Portuguese for their sense of discipline and operational efficiency.  For these 
qualities, they were known as Fiéis – the “faithful ones”.31  
 
A smaller foreign contingent was provided by a band of dissenters from 
Kenneth Kaunda’s Zambia. PIDE had become aware of the existence of such 
disaffection in 1967, when Operation Colt was launched to attract into eastern 
Angola any Zambians who might be employed in destabilizing operations or in 
combat against MPLA and UNITA guerrillas.32 Hypothetically, their reward 
would be Portuguese support to the overthrow of Kaunda’s regime, an objective 
also cherished by elements of South Africa’s security forces.33 Stationed in the 
Cazomba Salient, they were organized in a company (Special Group 600), 
undertaking several missions in support of the local army battalion. Never 
totalling more than 120 elements, they also received a flattering codename: 
Leais (the “loyal ones”), and they too were trained by army officers and 
monitored by PIDE officials.34 
 
Lastly, the fourth category of African forces comprised the largest 
number of irregular forces – the local militias – whose formidable growth in the 
war’s final years (estimated at 30,000 by 1974) was a direct consequence of the 
expansion of the resettlement programs fostered by the Portuguese.35 These 
militias operated under two banners. One was the OPVDCA (Organização 
Provincial dos Voluntários de Defesa Civil), which acquired an increasingly 
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multiracial profile in its membership, and was fundamentally committed to the 
security of the colony’s economic infrastructure (businesses, roads, 
communications networks). The other were known as the Corpo Militar de 
Segunda Linha (second line military corps), whose main task was to defend the 
‘strategic hamlets’ and villages that were the core of the aldeamento program, 
its units normally operating under the supervision of a Portuguese army 
officer.36 Organized in platoons, only a small percentage had access to proper 
firearms, the majority relying on spears, bows and arrows and other ‘home-
made’ weapons.37   There is little information available on the ethnic 
composition of these forces, but although there were some examples of local 
ethnic animosities being exploited in a ‘divide and rule’ strategy,38 there was no 
general policy designed on ethnic lines.39  Army documents do reveal, however, 
that these units were considered “expendable”, frequently being deployed for 
the interception and pursuit of enemy groups, coups de main and other ‘risky’ 
missions.40 
 
Portuguese propaganda and general news coverage depicted these 
African allies as dedicated opponents of communist inspired ‘terrorists’, and 
inspiring examples of Portugal’s capacity to foster a sense of patriotic allegiance 
among the native populations of the Ultramar.41  In other words, they were 
placed at the centre of the multiracial ‘integrationist’ ideology that was the heart 
of Portugal’s late colonial orthodoxy, most notoriously in Angola. There is 
nothing in the documentary record to indicate that the Portuguese ever 
developed a clear view as to how such African forces might fare at the point of 
colonial “exit”, or that the considered what the fate of such protagonists might 
be should a nationalist government ever come to power.42   
 
While official Portuguese policy never countenanced the possibility of 
giving up colonial rule, covert negotiations did in fact take place with Angola’s 
nationalists.  The most important of initiative was the attempt made in the final 
years of the Portuguese counter-insurgency war in Angola to co-opt UNITA’s 
rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi.  From 1966, UNITA had waged a somewhat 
ineffective campaign in the eastern districts of Lunda and Moxico. To counter 
this, Operação Madeira (Operation Timber) began in 1971 as a non-aggression 
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pact between the local military authorities and UNITA’s chief, mediated by local 
timber merchants and a priest.  This gradually evolved into a more complex 
dialogue as each side explored what concessions they might exact from the 
other.43  At the peak of this collaboration, the Portuguese agreed to provide 
medical assistance to Savimbi and abstain from engaging UNITA in combat, 
while UNITA guerrillas declined to attack the Portuguese army, supplied 
intelligence on MPLA camps, and directed their combat activities against the 
units of the MPLA.  When these negotiations were revealed in 8 July 1974, a few 
days after UNITA became the first independence movement to reach a cease-
fire agreement with the Portuguese, Savimbi did all he could to deny that such 
exchanges had ever occurred. But in the following years an impressive body of 
evidence gradually emerged, seriously undermining the credibility of such 
denials.44  
 
The success in neutralizing UNITA, and the general stabilization of the 
security situation in the eastern regions of Angola after 1972, was a major 
achievement for the Portuguese counterinsurgency, some even seeing this as a 
‘military victory’.45 With their own internal divisions, a lack of significant 
external military support, and the aggressive counter-insurgency tactics 
pursued by the Portuguese, each of the three Angolan insurgent movements 
were on the defensive from 1972 onwards. According to official records, by 1973 
Portugal had 65,592 troops stationed in Angola, of which 27,819 were locally 
recruited (42.4%).46  This compared with a total insurgent force of something 
like 10,ooo to 15,000 combatants – and even this estimate may be inflated.47 
The Portuguese were certainly not loosing their war in Angola in 1974, and they 
appeared to have secured a reliable body of African allies through a consistent 
policy opportunistic incorporation and strategic deployment: as Pellisier has 
observed, ‘no African units ever mutinied or defected throughout the course of 
the war’.48  
 
The economic performance of the Angolan colony, boosted by the oil, 
mining and agricultural sectors, was equally impressive by 1974, although little 
of this prosperity benefitted Angola’s native population. But in the last years of 
the colonial era, public investment in infrastructure increased, and the state was 
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finally able to provide a number of public services to the African population in 
areas like rural development, education, sanitation and medical care. Even if its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the non-white population could hardly be taken for 
granted, the colonial state in Angola seemed reasonably well entrenched, and 
for the first time not only in the coastal areas, but in the hinterland regions as 
well.49 
 
The road to Alvor  
 Any complacency that a vision of “colonial progress” may have invoked 
was shattered in the near bloodless overthrow of Caetano’s regime in Lisbon on 
25 April 1974.  Some of the key-figures of the officer’s movement that led this 
coup, the MFA, had clear views on how Portugal’s colonial disengagement 
should proceed. The purpose of the members of the coordinating committee of 
the MFA was to reach cease-fires with the African guerrillas in Guinea, Angola 
and Mozambique, as quickly as possible and then negotiate the arrangements 
for a swift transfer of power to the armed nationalist movements, whom they 
regarded as the sole legitimate interlocutors in any independence agreement for 
the colonies. However, this strategy was disputed by General Spínola, the  
officer the MFA co-opted to head the National Salvation Junta immediately 
after the deposition of Marcelo Caetano. Spínola, a prestigious military 
commander with his own decolonization agenda, tried to put forward an 
alternative route - self-determination for the overseas provinces through 
plebiscites organized by the Portuguese authorities under UN supervision – to 
the one favoured by the MFA. But the political dynamic unleashed by the coup 
in Lisbon, the growing ascendancy acquired by the ‘progressive’ wing of the 
MFA (which included a significant number of NCO’s, many of them highly 
politicized and connected to left-wing political parties in the metropolis), as well 
as other international and local factors, soon exposed the shortcomings of 
Spinola’s approach, especially in those territories where local conditions gave 
the guerrillas the upper hand against a rapidly demotivated and dysfunctional 
Portuguese conscript army.50  
 
Although he was therefore compelled to give way in Guinea-Bissau and 
Mozambique, until his dismissal from the Presidency in late September 1974, 
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Spínola took various steps to preserve a measure of Portuguese influence in 
post-independence Angola.  This included an elaborate independence plan, first 
set out on 9 August 1974, and diplomatic approaches to Mobutu - allegedly to 
secure his support for a broad anti-MPLA coalition, formed by the FNLA and 
UNITA along with other political parties, associations and pressure groups, 
many of whose leading figures had close ties to the colonial regime.  These 
efforts would ultimately fail, but it soon became evident that the Estado Novo’s 
collapse had broken the morale of a large number of Portuguese military units 
in Angola, both in the regular army and among the ‘irregular’ or special African 
forces. In early July 1974, an orderly demonstration by black junior officers, 
sergeants and soldiers of the colonial army in Luanda, in protest against the 
passivity of the security forces towards acts of violence against black Africans in 
some of the capital’s musseques (shantytowns), gave a serious warning that 
discipline was under threat in the racially mixed units of the army.51  On 17 July 
1974, Spínola’s appointed Governor of Angola, General Silvério Marques, had to 
be recalled to Lisbon after he was accused of obstructing the MFA’s program 
and refusing to purge the much hated PIDE. 
 
Silvério Marques was replaced by Rosa Coutinho, a naval officer whom 
the white settlers soon nicknamed ‘Red Admiral’, on account of his bias toward 
the MPLA and the Soviets. During Coutinho’s stint as head of Angola’s 
Governing Junta (from July to December 1974) significant steps were taken to 
dismantle or ‘emasculate’ a number of key institutions of the former colonial 
apparatus, as well as to facilitate the infiltration of several public services 
(including civilian and military radio stations) and economic structures by 
MPLA activists or fellow-travellers.  At the same time, a number of white 
extremist groups were suppressed.52  
 
By the time Spínola stepped down from the Presidency, on 28 
September 1974, Agostinho Neto’s emissaries from the MPLA were already 
embedded in Luanda and seeking foreign military assistance in Cuba, the USSR 
and other Eastern bloc countries.53  The balance of power in Lisbon now tilted 
unequivocally in favour of those in the MFA who wished to secure Portugal’s 
interests in Luanda – though it would certainly prove difficult proved difficult to 
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secure formal guarantees aimed at protecting the interests of the settler 
community, as well as the safety of those Africans who had collaborated with the 
colonial state.  The Alvor summit, of 10 to 15 January 1975, brought together the 
FNLA, UNITA, MPLA and the Portuguese government, to work out the details 
of Angola’s transition to independence.  The fate of the former ‘loyalists’, both in 
the army and in other areas of the colonial bureaucracy (not least the networks 
of PIDE informants), was on the agenda, with the Portuguese making efforts to 
impress upon the nationalists the need to avoid arbitrary acts of reprisal, and if 
necessary to bring to Portuguese courts those who might face criminal charges 
for their complicity with the colonial regime. The Angolan negotiators were also 
informed that the PIDE archives were likely to be repatriated to Portugal while 
the summit was taking place: the Portuguese delegation adamantly refused to 
make any documents available to the nationalists.54 
 
The condition of the African elements serving in the colonial army, as 
well as the various ‘irregular forces’, was also discussed. Among the permanent 
cadre of the Armed Forces, those few Africans entitled to a state pension (a 
modest contingent) were given preference, while the future subsistence of all 
others could not be guaranteed by Lisbon. The Portuguese were keen to 
persuade the nationalists to accept the idea of an ‘amnesty’ that would apply to 
all those who had belonged to “military and paramilitary organizations, upon 
the initiative of the colonial authority”.55  A secret additional protocol to the 
Alvor agreement was established to define the amnesty, but this measure was in 
no sense considered as binding – the Portuguese fully realising they would have 
no influence over this once power was handed over.  The minutes of the Alvor 
meetings also show that there was considerable interest in the immediate fate of 
those Africans who had served in self-defence militias and ‘special forces’.  Not 
surprisingly, the nationalists were also concerned with what might happen to 
the weapons and equipment of such forces. The nationalists viewed such units 
as potential recruits to their own armed wings – whether or not these forces 
eventually merged into a future national army, as was intended in the Alvor 
agreements.56  Squabbling over the fate of these forces had in fact begun months 
earlier, with emissaries from all three nationalist movements (FNLA, MPLA and 
UNITA) visiting the camps of the Katangese Fiéis in an effort to recruit them to 
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their cause.57   This was indicative of the covert military planning that both the 
FNLA and the MPLA were engaged in long before the elections scheduled for 
October 1975.58  
 
The MPLA were to some extent successful in assimilating former 
colonial soldiers into their own cadres, and this was achieved the complicity of 
key elements of the local MFA. On the one hand, the MFA’s attitude was 
justified by the need to ensure a minimal equilibrium between the armed wings 
of the three movements. At this stage, Neto’s MPLA, still recovering from the 
factional disputes that had enfeebled its leadership since 1972, was perceived by 
their Portuguese sympathizers as particularly vulnerable in terms of its military 
capacity (5,500 to 8,000 elements, although a number of them recruited from 
Luanda’s Poder Popular committees, against Holden Roberto’s estimated 
21,000 combatants, and Savimbi’s 3,000 t0 8,000 fighters).59 On the other 
hand, there was an unmistaken pro-MPLA bias that was common not only to 
the ‘progressive’ wing of the MFA, but also to large sectors of the then 
hegemonic Portuguese left. This is usually explained by a mixture of ideological 
affinities (the MPLA being recognized as the only trustworthy movement in 
terms of its formal non-racial stance and commitment to a ‘modern’ socialist 
ideal),60 and a sense that some of the Lisbon and Coimbra educated leaders of 
the MPLA would facilitate a post-imperial ‘fraternal’ relationship, especially 
when compared with the profiles of its two rival movements: Roberto, 
established in Kinshasa for more than 15 years, was seen by many as a ‘pawn’ of 
Mobutu; whereas Savimbi, educated in American protestant missions, was 
perceived as an opportunist all too ready to resort to a chauvinistic rhetoric 
whenever the circumstances required it. 
 
This MFA bias, however, was to some extent counterbalanced by the 
attitude of the ‘caretaker’ High Commissioner, General Silva Cardoso, a 
‘moderate’ air force officer who tried to assume some equidistance towards the 
three Angolan parties. Very soon, though, he found himself totally impotent to 
ensure the enforcement of some of the basic arrangements enshrined in the 
Alvor accord and prevent the violent expression of factional antagonisms. On 
the 11 March 1975, political events in Lisbon (the ultimate defeat of the Spinolist 
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faction) paved the way for an intensification of the political in-fighting and 
further undermined the cohesiveness of the departing colonial power. The 
dispatch of special army units (paratroopers and commandos) to reinforce or 
replace contingents stationed in Angola could no longer be taken for granted, 
and the operational capacity of the remaining Portuguese army units was, in 
some places outside Luanda, next to nil. 
 
It was against this backdrop that the enlistment of former colonial 
troops in the paramilitary units of the rival nationalist parties gathered pace. In 
this process, expediency overruled considerations of the suitability and 
reliability of the men to be recruited.  Once more, the documentary evidence on 
this is scarce and fragmentary, although the Katangese Fiéis present an 
exception here. With the retreat of the Portuguese, the Katangese Fiéis were 
caught in a delicate situation. They especially feared the possibility that Holden 
Roberto’s FNLA (highly dependent on Mobutu’s support) might manage to seize 
power in an independent Angola. In the previous months, Portuguese officials 
hesitated as to the best solution for these foreign soldiers, but the consensus had 
been to avoid delivering them either to Mobutu, and perhaps negotiate their 
admission in one of the neighbouring ‘white’ states, be it Rhodesia or South 
Africa.61 Gradually, however, the prospect of an alliance with an MPLA started 
to assert itself. The fact that Major Pezarat Correia, a key MFA member in 
Angola, had been responsible for the supervision of all the ‘irregular’ units 
stationed in the east, seems to have been a critical factor in the rapprochement 
that was now reached between the MPLA and the Fiéis.  In early 1975, their 
leader, General Nathaniel Mbumba, was persuaded by Coutinho to come to 
terms with the MPLA leadership, since the Mobutu/Neto antagonism would 
provide a sound basis for a fruitful cooperation. Having already ‘rebranded’ 
themselves the ‘National Front to the Liberation of Congo’ (FNLC in its French 
acronym) under the previous regime (in order to dissipate their reputation as a 
purely mercenary force), they were now also keen to choose a more fitting 
military label for themselves in 1975: they choose Tropas de Infantaria e 




A more obscure case is that of the Zambian Leais, whose small 
numbers made the Portuguese less concerned as to their immediate future. At 
the Alvor summit they were referred to as either having escaped to South Africa, 
or returned to Zambia. In fact, some of them, the supporters of Adamson 
Mushala, a Zambian dissident politician who resorted to armed struggle in the 
early 1970s, had already received political asylum from South Africa, and were 
transported in a Portuguese military airplane to Caprivi, in November 1974.63 
Those who preferred to stay in their camp in Calunda may have reached and 
accommodation with UNITA. Since Savimbi’s movement was at the time backed 
by Lusaka, it is likely that some sort of amnesty may have been secured and 
used as an inducement to attract them to UNITA. 
The scarce evidence we possess regarding other elements suggests that 
the assimilation of former ‘loyalists’ in the various para-military wings of the 
three movements rested on a number of factors. These may have included the 
regional location of their original units, family ties and ethnic affinities.64 Thus, 
significant members of the GEs, mainly drawn from the Bakongo people in the 
Angolan provinces bordering Zaire, appear to have joined the FNLA, allowing it 
to became the strongest force in the north – with the exception of Cabinda, 
where former TEs soldiers65 helped to resurrect the local micro-nationalist 
group FLEC (apparently with the encouragement of a subsidiary of the French 
oil company Elf);66 while some former Flechas opted for the MPLA, the 
movement that had acquired great influence in the enclave immediately after 
Rosa Coutinho authorized a joint MPLA/MFA operation (October 1974) to 
depose a local governor, a Portuguese military officer, who was allegedly 
facilitating the separatist’s organizing efforts.67  A number of ethnic Ovimbundu 
from the TEs appear to have accepted the compensations of the Alvor 
demobilization program and then headed south, to join UNITA forces. Stationed 
in bases located in the northern and eastern military zones, many of the c. 3000 
GEs appear to have dissolved either in the ranks of the FNLA or the MPLA, but 
here ethnic allegiances may not have played such a decisive role.  
 
Another factor that needs to be taken into account were the personal 
acquaintances or even the bonds forged between former colonial officers and 
their subordinates. This seems to have been an important element in the choices 
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made by the aforementioned Fiéis and other special forces based in the east, but 
also by some of the Flechas in the Cuando-Cubango region,68 whose PIDE 
instructors were making their way to South Africa to join the motley groups of 
mercenaries and former Portuguese army officers that were about to take part in 
various Western sponsored interventions aimed at preventing a Soviet-Cuban 
victory in Angola. 
 
Very little is known of the trajectories of the Africans who performed 
auxiliary roles in the rural militias in various districts, or in sundry security 
forces (PSP [Polícia de Segurança Pública, the urban police], Rural Guard, Fiscal 
Guard, DIAMANG’s (abbreviation for the Diamond Company of Angola, a 
multinational concession company) private police), but various sources suggest 
a pattern of dispersion among the three movements similar to the one observed 
in the special forces, again with preferences dictated by the same set of motives. 
Their demobilization also implied the plundering of an arsenal of some 40,000 
light weapons (and in some cases of radio equipment and files).69 
 
In the case of Luanda, however, it is likely that after the MPLA’s victory 
for the control of the city (July 1975) those who may have hesitated regarding 
their future allegiances now had a powerful incentive to align their fortunes with 
Neto. While some Portuguese elite units, such as the paratroopers, may have 
retained a significant operational capacity, the fact is that a sense of 
disorientation and impotence became evident among the Portuguese 
authorities. The policy of ‘active neutrality’ proclaimed on 22 May 1974 by the 
Revolutionary Council in Lisbon (the supreme organ of the MFA, created after 
the 11 March events) was resented both by the MPLA (which expected a more 
forthcoming attitude from their leftist sympathizers in Lisbon), and by some 
high ranking Portuguese officers in Angola who felt disorientated towards such 
an ‘ambiguous’ concept.70 After declaring that the basic provisions of the Alvor 
agreements should be considered as ‘suspended’, and having failed all its 
attempts to reconcile the belligerents, Portugal’s logical step, as the acting 
‘administrative power’, should have been to postpone the independence date: 




Space constraints prevent us from elaborating on the complex factors 
that determined the outcome of the first instalment of the Angolan civil war, 
which culminated in the recapture of almost all the provinces held by the FNLA 
and UNITA by the MPLA forces in November and December 1975, and the wide 
international recognition of Neto’s government (February-March 1976). The 
impact that some of the former loyalists may have had in a number of decisive 
confrontations, in a ‘conventional’ conflict that was new to many of them, is still 
largely undocumented. Nevertheless, a few accounts do mention the specific 
contribution made by some of them. This is the case of the 200 Katangese who 
took part in the Quifangondo battle (10 November 1975), which halted the 
advance of a column of FNLA soldiers, Zairians and Portuguese mercenaries 
that tried to launch an assault on Luanda before the Alvor’s agreed 
independence date (11 November), as well as in other combats against UNITA 
forces in Lucusse and Luena, in the Moxico district.71 Some Bushmen from 
Flechas, together with soldiers loyal to Daniel Chipenda, a former MPLA 
guerrilla commander and Neto challenger who shortly after the Alvor agreement 
allied himself with the FNLA, are also credited to have participated in Operation 
Savannah as an autonomous company in South Africa’s Defense Force (Combat 




Given the fact that the new regime which emerged after the dissolution 
of the colonial order in Angola derived its legitimacy from the anti-imperialist 
stance taken by its founding party, it is not surprising that former loyalist 
combatants who eventually joined the ranks of their former enemies preferred 
to keep silent as to their past experience as collaborators of the Portuguese. 
Understandably, their new masters were also prone to embrace a pragmatic 
stance in order to take full advantage of their military skills and know-how.  
 
Looking at some of the dimensions of the ‘Africanisation’ drive of the 
1960s, a number of questions raised by Douglas Wheeler in an article published 
in 1976 remain difficult to answer73. For instance, what were the motives for the 
relatively large adhesions of Africans to Portugal’s auxiliary/special troops?  
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And what was the measure of coercion and free will in those enlistments? The 
aim for better living conditions, ensured by a regular salary, medical care and 
other benefits, such as schooling and agricultural assistance, as remarked by 
Cann, is a plausible explanation. Cann also mentions a situation common in 
many counterinsurgency scenarios, the ‘allure’ of the winning side, which in vast 
areas of Angola was more likely to be associated with the Portuguese, at least 
from 1972.74  One may also take into account the possibility that the enlistment 
of some Africans in the new forces set up during the counterinsurgency 
campaigns may have been determined by a tradition of military service in their 
own families, as it happened in many imperial contexts. The notion that the 
colonial authorities may have somehow been successful in fostering a 
sentimental allegiance to the ‘multiracial’ mythology of the Ultramar among 
large sectors of the African population, in part thanks to the multi-ethnic 
composition of the regular army units,75 seems more difficult to sustain 
however. The political expectations of Angola’s ‘foreign’ combatants, the 
Katangese and Zambians, was of course different.  Here, Portugal’s stance was 
typically cynical. Promises of support to an overthrow of the Mobutu and 
Kaunda regimes were made in order to sustain the motivation of these units, but 
Lisbon was all too aware of the powerful Western interests that were implicated 
in the survival of the governments in Kinshasa and Lusaka.  
 
Although we know relatively little about the careers of the men who 
made the transition from ex-colonial troops to the armed forces of the new 
Angolan state, the FAPLA (Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola, 
rebranded as Forças Armadas Angolanas [FAA] after the 1991 peace accords), 
some were able to reach high positions, up to the rank of General.76  In the case 
of the MPLA regime, the dramatic absence of trained cadres and personnel able 
to operate the basic structures of the economy and state apparatus inherited 
from the colonial era (the oil sector and the armed forces being the most 
obvious examples), encouraged the ruling elite to adopt an attitude of 
expediency towards many individuals whose political backgrounds may 
otherwise have been considered suspect. Hence, the significance of ‘situational’ 
factors (to the detriment of other allegiances, ideological or ethno-political, for 
instance), as recently highlighted by several case studies of ‘mobile’ African 
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soldiers in the context of the liberation struggles of Southern Africa, is 
confirmed by these Angolan examples77. 
With regard to the most ‘peculiar’ contingent of the former allies of the 
Portuguese, the Katangese, pragmatism was also in evidence. In August 1978, in 
the aftermath of the two ‘Shaba Wars’, Mobutu and Neto, under significant 
pressure from their international patrons to reach a modus vivendi, agreed to 
cease support for groups committed to the overthrow of their respective 
regimes. Nevertheless, former FLNC (Front de Libération Nationale du 
Congo)members (or their descendants) were assimilated into FAPLA’s ranks 
and, according to Larmer and other sources, continued to be employed in 
operations against UNITA in the following decades, ‘particularly in the strategic 
diamond mining areas close to the Zairian border’78, as well as in support of 
Laurent Kabila against Mobutu in 1997.79 
 
The easy assimilation of former loyalists in the post-1974 period in 
Angola by the armed wings of the three independence movements, and the 
absence of any massive or organized vengeance against them, presents a striking 
contrast with the fate of similar forces in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, not 
to mention the tragic destiny of many Algerian harkis in 1962.80  In Guinea-
Bissau, a number of ex-African commandos and members of the local militias 
(on whom Spínola had relied both to improve his operational efficiency, as well 
as to promote his ‘hearts and minds’ campaign Por uma Guiné Melhor/For a 
Better Guinea) were arrested by the PAIGC’s (Partido Africano para a 
Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde) security forces.  Some years later an 
unspecified number of those former loyalists ended up being executed: initially 
in 1975, and then again in 1980. In the first instance, the number of eliminated 
soldiers may have totalled 5381;in the aftermath ofthe coup that overthrew the 
government dominated by the PAIGC’s Cape Verdean elite, the sole newspaper 
published in Guinea-Bissau, Nô Pintcha, published a list of 500 executed 
individuals, but many more are also believed to have been eliminated.82 A small 
number of former commandos and militias were able establish themselves in 
Portugal after Guinea’s independence, where many struggle to survive with their 
state pensions and get proper medical assistance. Expressions of official 
recognition for their contribution to the war effort in Guinea were discreet and 
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somewhat conditioned by the controversial status that the colonial wars still 
retain in Portugal’s collective consciousness. But they have received support 
from several veterans’ associations to seek an improvement of their living 
condition and better access to health care provisions.83 
 
In independent Mozambique there was a kind of ‘in-between’ situation. 
FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) emerged highly confident 
from the Lusaka agreement with Portugal (6 September 1974) and, for a number 
of reasons, was unwilling to integrate en masse former loyalist troops in the 
ranks of the newly constituted armed forces. Having ruled out the type of drastic 
solution adopted by the PAIGC, its leadership was nevertheless aware of the 
threats that a disbandment of such ‘internal enemies’ might pose to the state’s 
security. Therefore, they chose a different path: the social and political 
‘rehabilitation’ of the former colonial ‘collaborators’. This was done through 
their interment in ‘re-education camps’ and through the public diffusion of 
testimonies in which these ‘new men’, now devoted to the revolutionary cause, 
expressed their repentance. As Borges Coelho has shown, this process appears 
not to have achieved its main goals, since many of them ended up crossing the 
border to Rhodesia and form the embryo of RENAMO (Resistência Nacional 
Moçambicana), the anti-FRELIMO guerrilla movement that would wage a long 
attrition war against Maputo’s government (with the assistance of Rhodesia and 
South Africa).84 
 
 Determined to ensure a friendly and cooperative bilateral relationship 
with the new authorities of their former colonial territories, the political and 
military elite who ruled post-revolutionary Portugal lacked the means, and the 
interest, to act on behalf of many of these former loyalists. In the case of Guinea, 
efforts were indeed pursued by veterans’ organizations to ensure that some of 
the legal provisions regarding Lisbon’s obligations towards their former African 
soldiers were put into effect, but for many years the executions which took place 
in 1975 (and afterwards) went almost unnoticed in the Portuguese media. In the 
case of Angola such problems did not arise. But the immediate evolution of the 
relationship between Lisbon and Luanda was fraught with political 
misunderstandings and diplomatic incidents, which can in many cases be traced 
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to the transition period. In 1974-75, the Portuguese state was itself experiencing 
a convoluted process in which different factions struggled to assert their 
supremacy, something that made the pursuit of a coherent policy towards 
Angola extremely hard. The MPLA leadership resented the ‘reluctant’ attitude 
which the left and centrist parties in Portugal had adopted vis-à-vis the 
recognition of Neto’s regime in late 1975, and this soured the Luso-Angolan 
relationship for years to come. Eventually, it was the links which former MFA 
officials had been able to forge with senior MPLA figures that would allow for a 
measure of normalization’ in the late 1970s, symbolized by Ramalho Eanes and 
Agostinho Neto’s Bissau summit in 1978, something which, ironically, several 
centre-right Portuguese governments, ideologically at odds with the MPLA’s 
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